Motion Hearing - January 20, 2011

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                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                       EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
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                             SOUTHERN DIVISION
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     THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                  Plaintiff,
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                                         Case No. 10-20454
        VS.
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     YU QIN and SHANSHAN DU,
                                        Hon. Marianne O. Battani
 7
                  Defendants.
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 9
                              MOTION HEARING
10
                BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARIANNE O. BATTANI
                       United States District Judge
11
                 Theodore Levin United States Courthouse
                       231 West Lafayette Boulevard
12
                            Detroit, Michigan
                        Thursday, January 20, 2011
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14
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15
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                            STANLEY J. JANICE
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                              on behalf of Shanshan Du
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      Detroit, Michigan
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      Thursday, January 20, 2011
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      at about 10:15 a.m.
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               (Court and Counsel present.)
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               THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise.
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               The United States District Court for the Eastern
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     District of Michigan is now in session, the Honorable
 9
     Marianne O. Battani presiding.
10
               You may be seated.
11
               This is United States vs. Yu Qin and Shanshan Du.
12
               THE COURT: Good morning.
13
               MS. CORKEN: Good morning, Your Honor.
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     Cathleen Corken on behalf of the United States.
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               MR. JANICE: And Lee Janice on behalf of the
16
     U.S. Attorney's Office also.
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               MR. EAMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Frank Eaman
18
     on behalf of the Defendant, Yu Qin.
19
               MR. MORGAN: Good morning, Judge. Robert Morgan
20
     appearing on behalf of Shanshan Du.
21
                          All right. You may be seated. All
               THE COURT:
22
             Your clients are not here?
23
                           No, Your Honor. We checked with the
               MR. EAMAN:
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     Court and --
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               THE COURT: They don't have to be here if they know
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and agree.
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                           We advised them of the motion hearing,
               MR. EAMAN:
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     we advised them that their attendance was not mandatory, and
     we advised them that we didn't need them here, and they
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 5
     consented to proceeding in their absence.
 6
                           All right. There are a couple of the
               THE COURT:
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     motions that I think are basically agreed. The defense has a
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     motion for 404(B) evidence.
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              MR. EAMAN: Request for 404(B) notice, yes, Your
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     Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. And the Government is aware of
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     that?
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              MS. CORKEN: Yes, Your Honor. We will provide that
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     notice reasonably in advance of trial.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MR. EAMAN:
                           There is no motion date set for motions
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     in limine in this case. We would only ask that the
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     Government provide that notice before the motion in limine
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     date, if the Court sets one, so that we have an opportunity
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     to address any 404(B) evidence in a motion in limine.
21
                           Any problem with that?
               THE COURT:
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               MS. CORKEN: No problem, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
24
               MR. EAMAN:
                           Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Then the motion to strike surplusage, I
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quess the a/k/a's.
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               MR. EAMAN:
                           Yes.
                                 The Government has agreed that
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     the indictment itself will redact the a/k/a's provided that
     we stipulate that Shanshan Du is also sometimes known as
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     Shannon, and also Yu Qin is -- the pronunciation of Q-I-N is
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            I believe that is the stipulation of the Government.
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               MS. CORKEN: That's right, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                          All right.
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              MR. EAMAN:
                           Thank you.
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               THE COURT:
                           Then I have a motion to suppress
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     evidence and a motion to dismiss the indictment, and included
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     within that motion is a request for an evidentiary hearing.
13
     Let's take that motion first. Who wants to argue that?
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               MR. EAMAN:
                           I'm going to argue the motion to
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     suppress on behalf of both myself and Mr. Morgan.
16
               THE COURT:
                          The motion to suppress?
17
               MR. EAMAN:
                           Did you say -- which motion did you
18
     say?
19
                           The motion to dismiss the indictment,
               THE COURT:
20
     but I have no problem with doing the suppress first.
21
               MR. EAMAN: Oh, no, I will proceed with that first.
22
                   I will also argue for both Defendants, if I
     That's fine.
23
     may?
24
               THE COURT:
                          Okay. Thank you.
25
               MR. EAMAN:
                          The motion to dismiss is simply based
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on a delay in this case. In the Government's response they indicate there are some legitimate reasons for delay; one is reconstructing torn-up evidence, and the other one is a privilege review. We would only point out to the Court that that does not consume all of the time of the delay here, only a portion of the time. The Government did delay this indictment for a substantial period of time, not all of which was consumed by showings they've made.

As to whether witnesses -- important witnesses have been lost, they allege that, for instance, one witness, I think Randy Meng, M-E-N-G, would have been a witness for the Government. We can argue back and forth about that. I think he would have been a helpful witness for the defense as well.

THE COURT: The biggest thing is he apparently was gone before the --

MR. EAMAN: Well, he was, but, you know, we might have been able to try to track him down or find him or follow him if we had thought he would have been a witness and at least get a statement from him and find out what is happening, but in limbo with no charges filed we are now facing an indictment with that problem.

And as to Mr. Jiang they said -- the Government has more access to travel information than we do, especially for people who are not United States citizens or people who travel internationally who are United States citizens, so we

are unaware of contact information for Mr. Jiang. If the Government could provide that to us that would be helpful, but that's all I'm going to say regarding the motion to dismiss, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Government?

MS. CORKEN: Yes. Your Honor, just very briefly. In order to prevail on their motion to dismiss the defense needs to show that the delay was an intentional devise employed by the Government as a tactic basically, and, second, that they suffered actual and substantial prejudice as a result of the delay. Their motion fails on both of those points.

With respect to prejudice, as the Court has pointed out, Mr. Meng left the country before the FBI even began their investigation. And with respect to Mr. Jiang, travel records do indicate that he is, in fact, available, that he travels very frequently to the United States, and has been back in the United States some 15 times since August of 2005.

There's certainly no showing that any delay was intentional on the part of the Government, or that it was a devise that was employed to obtain any kind of tactical advantage. There are certainly more reasons that we lay out in our response to the motion to dismiss that account for the delay than the two reasons cited by the defense. It wasn't just the tainting process, which was a lengthy process,

involved many steps, and it wasn't just the piecing together of the hundreds of shredded documents. The additional reasons related to the nature of the investigation which was incredibly complex and involved not only investigation into the Defendants' conduct with respect to theft of GM trade secrets but also of trade secrets belonging to the Control Power Company, and both aspects of the investigation were extremely time consuming.

As the Court is, I'm sure, aware it is a very technical case, the documents are very technical, and so every step of the way the investigators had to work in tandem with the relevant engineers.

There were also multiple computers that were seized at the time of the search warrant as well as numerous electronic devices, and there are hundreds of gigabytes of information on those devices and computers. All of that information had to be reviewed, again, in conjunction with engineers.

And in addition there are -- there were extensive investigative efforts that were directed toward potential charges that were not ultimately brought, for instance, violations of the Economic Espionage Act. So that aspect of the investigation involved obtaining and reviewing numerous financial records, for instance, as well as reviewing all of the e-mails in multiple e-mail accounts of the Defendants.

So there were a number of reasons that account for the delay but the bottom line is that the defense has not shown that there was any intent on the part of the Government to lengthen the investigation to obtain a tactical advantage, and certainly there is no showing of any actual substantial prejudice as a result of that delay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EAMAN: Just a brief response, Your Honor. In terms of the computer information or forensic analysis, I note the search warrant affidavit was signed May 19th, 2006, and it contained all kinds of information about e-mails and computer information, so we stand on our position that there are only two legitimate reasons disclosed by the Government for this delay.

THE COURT: All right. The Court has read the briefs that have been submitted in this matter and I have, of course, listened to the argument here this morning. And in reviewing this -- well, first of all, the Defendant ask -- I will speak when I say Defendant both Defendants because they have joined in this motion. The Defendants have asked for an evidentiary hearing on this matter, and the Court denies the request for evidentiary hearing because I think that there has been insufficient factual development to show that a hearing is necessary.

The Sixth Circuit has established a standard to

dismiss for pre-indictment delay, and that is that the defendant has the obligation to show substantial prejudice to the presentation of his defense, and he also has the obligation to show that the delay was an intentional devise by the Government to gain a tactical advantage.

In terms of showing actual prejudice as has been argued, defense argues that there were two witnesses that they no longer believe they have access to. Well, the one witness had left before, I think, if I'm correct, it was before General Motors referred this matter to the FBI so before this all actually -- the investigation started.

Defendant alleges that they could have tried to track down the witness and clearly they could have tried to track down the witness and that probably would have been easier at that time, but that's not sufficient to establish actual prejudice.

In terms of the other witness, the Government indicates that he has traveled to the United States some 15 times since the end of August 2005 and therefore is most likely available to the Defendant, and the Court would require the Government to verify this to the Defendant by just submitting the records that you have in terms of his travel, not necessarily all of the records, I simply mean to show that he has come into the United States this many times.

The second -- so I believe that the Defendant has

failed to show substantial prejudice. And I should go back and say that this case is within the statute of limitations, there is no question about that, and that has not been questioned by the Defendants.

The Court is most bothered in these cases when it seems to me that the Defendants are led to a certain degree of comfort that nothing is going to happen in the case because nothing happens for a number of years. In this case, clearly because of the technical nature of this case much has happened since the Complaint was dismissed, and there is no dispute that the Complaint was dismissed without prejudice in order for the Government to continue with its investigation and not violate a speedy trial demand.

The Court finds that in August of '06 the parties, and this again is not contested, stipulated to tainting procedures to review the evidence. There was discussion at that time regarding a certain program that was to be used. That program evidently took some time but the defense had the -- evidently had the program and reviewed these disks, but it didn't use that program according to the Defendants, the procedure, the FTK procedure, but it did take a couple of years before they were able to provide the results to the Government. The Government then required them pursuant to the agreement to use the FTK procedure and so it had to go back, and all of this technicality went back and forth for a

number of years, and so the Defendants were well aware that this case was proceeding but it was proceeding at a rather slow pace, and I say slow in chronological time because I do not know that it is slow in terms of computer time or the time necessary to process this information.

Also, the Government, as has been referenced, though I'm not actually sure of the date of this, but I think it is added only to show the technical difficulty is that the Government put back together a bag -- a plastic bag full of shredded documents, and that took some, I believe, 15 months or so.

So the Court finds that there has been no showing at all that the delay was an intentional devise by the Government to gain a tactical advantage, and therefore the Court denies the motion to dismiss the indictment and for evidentiary hearing.

All right. The motion to suppress. Mr. Eaman?

MR. EAMAN: Again, Your Honor, I will argue that on
behalf of Mr. Morgan and both Defendants, if the Court
please?

THE COURT: All right.

MR. EAMAN: There are several prongs of this motion, three principal ones, but before I get into the merits of those three prongs I just want to give a little background. I think the Court has been able to glean from

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the various motions and the indictment in this case that what happened in this case was that Mr. Qin was an employee at CPC Company, and that he was called into an office and challenged on the fact that he operated a company called Millennium Technologies that appeared to CPC to be in competition with CPC. That meeting occurred at a time when he was working at the CPC offices, and he had left in his office a backpack and a hard drive. He was removed from the building, and CPC recovered the backpack and the hard drive. The backpack -- the hard drive was not in the backpack, but the hard drive was accessed by CPC. What was in the backpack, and I advised the Government today that we have documents to support this but we haven't put this in our allegation so far, what was in the backpack was some cash which Mr. Qin found it necessary to call somebody to retrieve that backpack because he contends he was going to be escorted out of the building and he wanted to make sure that backpack was safely removed so that the cash would be safe. The cash was eventually returned by CPC. The person he called did not retrieve the backpack or the hard drive from the office. THE COURT: How much cash was in it? \$4,700. CPC then in looking at the MR. EAMAN: documents on the hard drive and in looking at documents on Qin's computer at CPC and --

THE COURT: Are you talking about a hard drive

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separate from this disk that we are talking about or no?
         MR. EAMAN:
                     Separate from --
         THE COURT:
                    From a disk when you talk about --
                          It is -- it was, I think, a
         MR. EAMAN:
                    No.
160-gigabyte hard drive so it was a block type item that was
in his office at CPC.
                       In looking at that -- and also they
escorted Mr. Qin home and asked him to turn over his CPC
laptop, which he did.
         In looking at these various documents they
discovered that on the documents were some GM files in a
Shanshan directory. As a result of discovering these GM
documents, and I don't have the exact chronology of how this
happened, but GM was notified, the Government was notified,
and the investigation then began.
         THE COURT:
                     They found the GM documents on the hard
drive --
         MR. EAMAN:
                    Correct.
         THE COURT:
                     -- right?
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Correct. MR. EAMAN:

What about on the laptop, was there any THE COURT: reference to --

I don't remember. One second. MR. EAMAN: they were on the laptop, Your Honor. My law clerk is here and he's done a lot of the computer analysis so I had to ask him that question.

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THE COURT:
                     I've read it too but at this point I
have forgotten where.
         MR. EAMAN:
                     I have too.
                     So you are saying the GM documents were
         THE COURT:
on the laptop, not the hard drive?
                     And the hard drive.
         MR. EAMAN:
                    And the hard drive?
         THE COURT:
                    They were on both. They were on both.
         MR. EAMAN:
         THE COURT:
                     Okay.
         MR. EAMAN:
                     As a result of that then this
investigation began, and the agents contacted GM
representatives and they prepared this affidavit in support
of a search warrant to search two places; one was the -- the
two residences of Qin and Du, one that was for sale where
they had moved a lot of stuff out but not all of their stuff,
and the other was their new residence and the new residence
was on Newcastle Drive.
         The search warrants were executed, and I just note
in passing we mentioned in our pleadings that the computers
they sought to seize had already been copied by CPC in their
civil lawsuit because they sued Qin in Oakland County Circuit
Court, and in that lawsuit he turned over computers that were
then -- the hard drives were removed and cloned and returned
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possession of CPC who was cooperating with the Government.

to Qin, so those hard drives had already been in the

Nonetheless, they got these search warrants to go look for mostly computers and/or documents, and they did seize tremendous amounts of documents as well as computers, drives and other computer devices when they seized.

The issues that we raise regarding the sufficiency of the warrant and whether or not there was good faith reliance on the warrant are three. There is a violation of Franks v. Delaware because the information contained is either intentionally false or reckless -- there is a reckless disregard for what the actual truth is.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. The information they obtained or you mean the information in the warrant?

MR. EAMAN: The information in the affidavit, right, is either intentionally false or there is reckless disregard for the truth.

The second is that there is no probable cause that there was a violation of the Trade Secrets Act because it requires an intent to convert the items. Possession is not illegal, but possession with intent to convert is, and there clearly was no evidence ascertainable that these documents, though possessed, were -- that there was any intent to convert them to any third party's use.

And then the third issue is the lack of probable cause regarding the Newcastle Drive home.

I will address them in that order if the Court

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On the Franks issue the Government responds that the
affiant's allegations are based on what he was told by
General Motors. However, as we point out in our reply in
support of the motion, some of those allegations which
allegedly came from General Motors are not attributed to
General Motors in the affidavit.
                                  They are stated by the
affiant as the affiant's own conclusions, and the affidavit
shows that the affiant was capable of quoting or attributing
sources when the information came from sources.
                                                 However, he
chooses not to do so in some critical allegations in that
indictment -- excuse me, in that affidavit.
                     Do you want to point that out?
         THE COURT:
         MR. EAMAN:
                     Yeah, it is in my reply.
         THE COURT:
                     I have your reply right here.
                     I will look for that. One second,
         MR. EAMAN:
         Page 4 and 5 of the reply, paragraph 37, it is the
affiant that states that a General Motors' representative
                                 The affiant does not state
stated a majority -- excuse me.
that a General Motors' representative stated a majority of
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And then again referred to on page --

motor controller card, et cetera, were marked as such.

the documents were marked confidential but states his own

conclusion that a majority of the documents pertaining to the

THE COURT: Now, the response or the Government indicates that a number of them were marked as confidential.

MR. EAMAN: Well, there is an issue here about what documents the affiant was referring to. He doesn't specifically identify the documents as documents — they say the documents shown to Savagian, the majority of those documents were marked confidential. As to that allegation the affidavit doesn't say the majority of the documents shown to Savagian were marked confidential. So we were proceeding on the premise that since the majority of the documents that are charged in the indictment are not marked confidential that the majority of the documents the affiant was referring to were not marked confidential, and that was a false statement.

We counted up 14 documents -- we got Savagian's 302, the Government has provided us with that. They use the code to identify the documents so we weren't sure which documents were shown to Savagian, but they gave us the code and we were able to decipher that. We believe that 14 documents were shown to Savagian and only five of those were marked proprietary or confidential, so we don't follow the Government's logic on that at all.

We do know, as I say, that many of those documents shown to Savagian, one of whom we were now able to identify called the HPSP code, was shown to Savagian and was marked confidential but is not in the indictment as a trade secret. So there's some confusion about this allegation of the,

quote, the majority of the documents were marked confidential. We don't believe the majority of the documents shown to Savagian were marked confidential and we know the majority of the documents in the indictment are not marked confidential, so we don't know how the Government gets to this conclusion that the majority were marked confidential. We believe that to be a false allegation or certainly a reckless disregard of the truth.

I think at an evidentiary hearing that could be cleared up if the Court is inclined to grant an evidentiary on the Franks claim, but perhaps more importantly here we believe that where -- there is an easy investigation that the agent can do to determine whether or not GM is making false allegations that he then just funnels into the affidavit that the failure to corroborate GM's allegations is a reckless disregard of the truth, and there are several allegations of General Motors that were false that he just funneled into the indictment.

Obviously, if there is a confidential informant or an anonymous source the affiant has a legal duty to review those allegations, investigate them himself or herself and determine whether or not there is corroboration for those allegations and determine whether or not the person providing the information is reliable.

There is no legal duty, strict legal duty, to

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corroborate or investigate allegations of a citizen but I think none of us want to live in a world where a citizen comes forward and makes allegations about criminal activity on another person and there is no investigation to determine whether or not those allegations are correct or whether or not the person is incorrect or lying or misrepresenting facts. So we believe that Franks — to avoid a reckless disregard of the truth, Franks requires some investigation of the allegations made by third persons.

A couple of important allegations made by General Motors, some of which, by the way, were retracted later in a subsequent interview of Savagian. It is important under the Trade Secrets Act whether a person has authorization to have the documents, and there are allegations made in here that Ms. Du had documents she had no authorization for. omission is that Savagian, who made these allegations, was not Ms. Du's supervisor. He was higher up the chain. not supervising her daily work or knew what she needed to do. It would have been a very easy investigative step for the agent or affiant to take to simply get Ms. Du's job description and/or personnel file. Had he done so he would have seen that in her job evaluation she specifically is evaluated for working on what is called the IGBT and also on simulation programs, two matters that Savagian told the FBI that he didn't think she had a right to have, and yet there

was no attempt to corroborate or investigate those allegations, and apparently there was no attempt to talk to her direct supervisor either.

And as to CPC falsehoods, the only allegation they make about a trade secret is one source code they say was proprietary but again it would have been an easy investigation to show that source code to any engineer any place who would have said that this source code cannot be proprietary because it is available to the public, it is on the Internet. So, again, there was no investigation of that allegation of CPC, and that's the only trade secret allegation of CPC.

We do indicate that there were allegations that were false that Ms. Du's job performance was not satisfactory. The Government attempts to rebut that in their response but I think they misunderstand performance evaluations and the percentage shown on the left side of those evaluations has to equal 100, and it is what percentage of your work is being done in those areas, not whether you have -- what you have completed, not what your job performance is. There is nothing in any performance evaluation of Ms. Du that indicates your job performance is unsatisfactory, you did anything wrong.

And I think the Court is probably familiar, buyouts are voluntary. As the affidavit says, it was a voluntary

buyout that she could have accepted or not. Had she not accepted the buyout she would have still continued as a GM employee. So it wasn't a case where she was threatened with termination because of unsatisfactory job performance, it was simply she was selected for a buyout. Selection of buyout can be for a variety of reasons. It could be that maybe there is more than needed engineers working on a particular project, but in any case a simple investigation would have produced no corroboration for negative performance evaluations.

A key omission that the agent had in this case is when he talked about the documents being marked confidential he neglected to state the General Motors' policy said that a trade secret is supposed to be marked secret and indicated so. And I think it is attachment C to our motion, page 1317 in the Bates-stamped edition that we received from the Government which delineates the difference between secret and confidential. Confidential is less restrictive. Secret is it is a trade secret. He didn't disclose that. So the marking of confidential may restrict its use but it doesn't designate it as a trade secret.

And since an element of the offense of appropriation of a trade secret is that they have to take reasonable steps to protect it the only thing that the affiant lists in the affidavit is they have pass codes, they

have security at the doors. Every company has that. We have that in our small law office. So those aren't any extraordinary steps that are taken for protecting of trade secrets, however, marking them a secret would be, and none of them were marked secret.

Also in omissions, Du had been confronted -- she was receiving a buyout when the -- she was confronted with the fact that CPC documents were present on computers that Qin had. She went home and deleted the documents from a drive that she found at home. She went looking for the documents because she told GM that she inadvertently copied these documents so she deleted them. She could not delete them from the hard drive or the laptop that Qin had because CPC had that, but she deleted them and she met with a GM representative and apologized and did that.

Another omission that we've recently discovered actually in our computer analysis is the documents on both the hard drive, the independent separate hard drive that was in Qin's office, and the laptop were what was called block copied. In other words, they were all created on those drives or computers at exactly the same time as one does when one creates a backup. And we -- our computer expert, the Government can dispute this if they wish, but we haven't received any expert reports from them or discovery in that regard yet, there has been -- there was no access to those

documents, and that's very simple computer forensic analysis to look at the dates the documents were created to look at whether there was access, but there was none. So that's an important omission because remember probable cause has to be shown that they intended to convert these items. Mere possession is not enough. There has to be an intent to convert.

And I disagree with the Government's allegation that just because they were working in the field of hybrid cars and they were electrical engineers is sufficient to show an intent to convert. Engineers working in hybrid cars sometimes go from company to company, but there is no allegation because that's the field they work in that that's sufficient to show that they intended to convert the items.

The probable cause regarding conversion again is not established by possession, but the language that is used in this indictment is something that I haven't seen. Now, this -- I'm done with the Franks argument, if the Court has any questions on that?

THE COURT: No.

MR. EAMAN: I will move on to the argument about no probable cause about conversion. The language establishing the intent to convert simply are opinions of people that they, quote, might have been using the documents, that they would be valuable, or they hypothetically provide. Those are

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the allegations about that they are to support an intent to They also talk about a 2004 proposal for a hybrid car that Qin was involved with which never got off the ground. And you will note that there are allegations that they reviewed the e-mail accounts of Qin and, again, as a critical omission, which sort of comes back to the Franks issue, there is no allegation in here that in reviewing the e-mail accounts they ever saw that he e-mailed anybody that he intended -- that he had General Motors' hybrid car information or that he ever e-mailed General Motors' hybrid The only e-mailing about the General car information. Motors' information was between Qin and Du while she worked at General Motors where calculations were exchanged between the two engineers, Qin and Du, who were married to each other.

So there is nothing in the affidavit that establishes an intent to convert or send them to anybody else or use them to send to anybody else, so we believe the affidavit failed as to that probable cause, and that an agent in good faith could not have believed that these allegations supported any conclusion that there was probable cause that they intended to convert these items, only that they possessed them. While that may be a civil infraction in the sense that there may be action that GM could take, it is not a criminal trade secrets violation without the intent to

convert.

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And the third area of argument about the probable cause of Newcastle Drive residence --

THE COURT: This is their new home?

That's their new home. MR. EAMAN: I think -- we cited in our reply the McPherson (phonetic) case, the Sixth Circuit case, where -- and it is an interesting case. thought I had cited it in the main brief but when I looked at the Government's response I had not. That was a case where a drug dealer was selling -- observed selling drugs in front of the house, and I think a confidential informant who was working with the police actually bought drugs from the defendant in front of his house. The affiant alleged that he had had a lot of experience in investigating drug dealers, that they frequently sold in front of their house but they kept the drugs in the house, which sounds logical. don't have to, of course. They could keep them in their pockets, they could keep them in their car, but that in his experience they kept them in the house. They got a search warrant to search his house for drugs based on the observation of selling the drugs outside of the house, and the conclusions -- the law enforcement conclusions that the drugs were being -- that drug dealers kept drugs in the house.

The Sixth Circuit said that's not enough. There

has to be actual particular probable cause as to what is in the house. An assumption or a general allegation as to what is in the house is not sufficient, and that's really what we have here.

Even in the affidavit and in the Government's response what we have is that, well, they used to live at Davis Court and they moved most of their stuff out of there, although there is one computer at Davis Court and there are some documents at Davis Court. They ran their business out of Davis Court. That was their home. Davis Court is still the registered address for Millennium Technologies, they haven't switched that.

THE COURT: But the house was sold, they were in the process of --

MR. EAMAN: It wasn't sold. It was being sold.

THE COURT: It was being sold.

MR. EAMAN: Being sold, that's true. There was a computer there and there were documents there, but there was no investigation to determine that, in fact, they had moved the MTI business things, the computers, to Newcastle. As the affiant noted in the affidavit they had previously had an office, an MTI office, at another location. There was no attempt to investigate where MTI was now because their registered address was still Newcastle. So what the agents did is what the same thing the agents did in McPherson --

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THE COURT:
                           MTI wasn't at Newcastle?
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                           It wasn't at Newcastle.
               MR. EAMAN:
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               THE COURT:
                          You said was still Newcastle.
                           I'm sorry. Still at Davis Court.
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              MR. EAMAN:
                                                               Ι
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     misspoke myself.
                       I apologize.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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                           It was still at Davis Court.
                                                          So there
               MR. EAMAN:
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     was no -- it was like McPherson in the sense that they said
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     these people were doing something at Davis Court and now they
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     have moved to Newcastle so they must be doing something at
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     Newcastle so we need to go there to find what is at
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     Newcastle, without any particular fact as to what was going
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     on at Newcastle or whether any of the items they sought to
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     seize were, in fact, at Newcastle. Nobody observed anything
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     there. Nobody did any investigation as to whether anything
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                 Nothing happened other than this family moved
     was there.
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     this residence, kept Davis Court as the registered address
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     for the business, and that was it.
                                          So we don't think that's
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     sufficient particular probable cause to go to that address to
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     search.
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               That concludes my arguments, Your Honor.
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                           What is it that you think would benefit
               THE COURT:
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     you in terms of an evidentiary hearing, what are you seeking
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     at the evidentiary hearing?
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               MR. EAMAN: What we are seeking is to show that
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there is evidence -- that we can show that there is evidence that the allegations -- the Franks claims that we make, that the allegations of the affiant were in reckless disregard of the truth because factually many of the allegations are false and there are many omissions in the allegations as well.

That's what we are asking for the evidentiary hearing as to that prong of our suppression argument.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. EAMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Corken.

MS. CORKEN: Your Honor, under Franks vs. Delaware in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing the Defendants must

MS. CORKEN: Your Honor, under Franks vs. Delaware in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing the Defendants must make a substantial preliminary showing with respect to three matters: One, that a false statement was made in the affidavit; two, that the affiant made that false statement intentionally or with reckless disregard of the truth; and thirdly, that there is no probable cause in the affidavit without the statement.

Focusing on the second requirement that it is the affiant who made the false statement, the Defendants' motion fails on that count. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals made clear in United States vs. Giacalone that the allegedly false statement must have been shown to originate, to originate, with the Government affiant, not a third party.

Now, Special Agent Jeffery Edwards, the affiant,

had no knowledge obviously of the GM documents, had no personal knowledge himself of the work duties of Shanshan Du. It is clear from the affidavit certainly that everything relating to GM came from GM, from Peter Savagian, in particular.

Now, the defense makes a somewhat artificial argument that every sentence in the affidavit had to begin with according to GM Engineering Director Peter Savagian, but that is an argument that really places form over substance. When you read the affidavit it is quite clear that the information originated with Peter Savagian in particular. And, again, Jeff Edwards, you know, doesn't work for GM. He would himself have no knowledge about the nature of the GM documents and whether they constitute trade secrets.

I would like to focus in particular on paragraph 37 because there's been a lot of argument about this paragraph by the Defendants, and this is one of their claims in terms of false statements. Paragraph 37 provides that the majority of the documents pertaining to, and this is critical, GM's hybrid electric motor controller card that GM deems confidential and proprietary were marked as such.

Now, the defense claims that this is a false statement, and they point to a -- the broad universe of every document that was on the hard drive used in the Defendants' business and state that, well, the majority of the

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documents -- all of the documents on this hard drive were not marked confidential and therefore this statement must be false.

Well, just to step back for a moment, CPC representatives recovered this hard drive that was used in the Defendants' business, Millennium Technologies, Incorporated, MTI, and they did find that there were numerous GM documents on that hard drive which we refer to as the MTI hard drive in our response, and they contacted GM. an image, a copy of that hard drive, and Peter Savagian, and this is according to the affidavit, Peter Savagian reviewed not the entirety of the MTI hard drive as it is clear in the affidavit, he reviewed one directory in that hard drive, and he identified trade secret documents of GM in that directory, and he categorized those documents as falling into five different categories of information, and those five categories are laid out in the affidavit. There are some documents, for instance, that related to GM power train sister information, that's one category that is set forth in the affidavit.

Paragraph 37 in the affidavit is in the section of the affidavit entitled GM hybrid motor controller card information. Peter Savagian identified specific documents from this directory that related to the GM hybrid motor controller card. The motor controller card is just a circuit

board.

In paragraph 35 the affidavit relates that

Peter Savagian identified particular information that was in
this directory that related to the circuit card to this motor
controller card. The affidavit states that he identified the
software source code for the card's microprocessors, the
programable logic devise configuration, the schematic and
assembly drawings for the card itself and the fabrication
drawings and detailed parts list. That's the universe of
documents that he identified that related to the GM hybrid
motor controller card that were in this directory on the MTI
hard drive.

Paragraph 36 goes on to describe whether Du's work duties required her to have these very specific documents. So the paragraph states that she would have had a legitimate reason to possess the software source code, but with respect to some of these other very specific documents she did not have a legitimate work reason to possess them.

Then paragraph 37, the critical paragraph, says the majority of the documents pertaining to the hybrid electric motor controller card that GM deems confidential and proprietary were marked as such.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, just stopping your argument there in 36, would the job descriptions have laid out what -- these things that are in

this paragraph or would it just be more general?

MS. CORKEN: It was more general. It was absolutely more general. The job performance evaluations, for instance, did not say one way or the other whether her work duties included assignments related to the programable logical devise.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. CORKEN: So just to go on, Your Honor, then in paragraph 38 it begins many of the aforementioned GM documents, and then paragraph 39 begins other documents, so it is clear from reading this section of the affidavit that the -- that this section, including paragraph 37, addresses very specific documents, those that are identified in paragraph 35, those that Peter Savagian identified that related to the motor controller card.

The defense has been provided with the 302 of Peter Savagian, and in that 302, just as in the affidavit, it is related that he identified particular documents relating to this controller card and there are a total of seven documents that he identified relating to this card. He provided — because at this point it was GM and GM alone who had the hard drive, the FBI didn't even have it.

Peter Savagian provided copies of those seven documents to Jeff Edwards. Jeff Edwards put those into evidence. A review of those seven documents indicates that five out of

seven of the documents were marked either confidential or proprietary, exactly what paragraph 37 says, that the majority of these documents, these documents that Peter Savagian identified that related to this hybrid controller card, were, in fact, marked confidential or proprietary. So there is no falsity in the statement that is set forth in paragraph 37.

The Defendants have also claimed -- before I move on, the Court could take out this entire section, paragraph 37 and everything that is set forth in this section of the affidavit relating to the hybrid controller card, and still find that Judge Scheer appropriately found probable cause. The affidavit sets forth four other categories of trade secret documents that Peter Savagian identified on the MTI hard drive, so removing this section does nothing to defeat probable cause in the affidavit which is, of course, one of the requirements set forth in Franks vs. Delaware that the defense must show that there is -- that probable cause is lacking if the allegedly false statement is redacted.

The defense also points to a paragraph relating to Shanshan Du's job performance and states that that is a false statement, and that it was --

THE COURT: It is what?

MS. CORKEN: That that's a false statement and that Agent Edwards should have known it was a false statement.

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THE COURT: Which number is that paragraph?

MS. CORKEN: It is in the front of the affidavit, I know. It is paragraph 18 of the affidavit on page 5, after several years Du's supervisors at GM considered Du's work performance mediocre. There were some friction between Du and her supervisors and peers, and then it goes on to say that Peter Savagian offered her this buyout and, you know, the implication obviously is that she was offered this buyout because her work performance wasn't up to snuff.

Now, the defense says, well, this has to be a false statement because her 2004 performance evaluation indicates that her performance was okay. Well, paragraph 18 does not state Du's performance evaluation in 2004 indicates that her performance was mediocre, it doesn't state that at all. says that her supervisors considered her work performance mediocre, and the 2005 performance evaluation does substantiate that, but more importantly, Jeff Edwards was speaking with Peter Savagian clearly and Peter Savagian was in the supervisory chain of Shanshan Du, and he was familiar with her work certainly, and there was nothing to indicate to Jeff Edwards that Mr. Savagian's opinion of her work performance was in any way to be doubted. And, in fact, it was basically corroborated by the fact that she was one of the employees that was chosen to, you know, be offered this buyout package, and it made sense that her performance was

not satisfactory and that she was chosen to receive that buyout package.

The defense also makes -- both in its reply and today makes much of whether documents are marked confidential or not. The bottom line is that there is no false statement in the affidavit relating to those markings. I would certainly dispute the defense characterization of the GM training materials. Those training materials, which are attached as Attachment C to the defense's reply, do not indicate that only documents marked secret are considered trade secret. In fact, it states that those documents that are marked secret are often considered strategic or trade secrets. It certainly doesn't exclude the possibility that GM documents marked confidential or proprietary or not marked at all are still considered GM trade secrets.

More importantly, it is not GM's definition of trade secret that controls, it is the statute's definition of trade secret that controls. There is nothing in the statute that indicates that a document must be marked by a company in some way to be considered a trade secret. The statute specifically provides that the measures taken by a company to protect its trade secret information must be reasonable, and that's the only thing that the statute requires.

Now, certainly Magistrate Judge Scheer could find that the measures that GM employed to protect its

information, whether they were marked or not, were reasonable measures, and those measures are laid out in some detail in a separate section of the affidavit. They encompass physical measures and electronic measures. A document, regardless whether it is marked or not, could certainly be protected by restrictions on access, for instance. So the litmus test is not in the statute whether a document is marked confidential or not, and most importantly the information that is in the affidavit relating to the markings of documents is absolutely accurate.

The last point in terms of false statements that the defense raises today in its papers relates to this confrontation that Du had with GM representatives, and the claim is that during that confrontation she apologized for having taken GM documents home and that she had deleted them. Well, in fact, there were no deletion -- there weren't deletions of GM materials. We now know after computer forensics that the GM trade secret documents exist on multiple computers and electronic devices and were not deleted at the time that they were seized in May of 2006, well over a year after Shannon Du left GM's employment. The forensics, just for the record, also indicate that, in fact, those documents were accessed after she left GM employment as well.

Your Honor, moving on to -- just to conclude that

section of my argument, the defense has not established by a substantial preliminary showing that there are any statements in the affidavit that are false. They haven't established that Jeff Edwards intentionally lied or acted with reckless disregard to the truth, and they certainly have not shown that redaction of the allegedly false statements basically destroys the probable cause in the affidavit, so an evidentiary hearing is not warranted under these circumstances.

THE COURT: Do you think that an evidentiary hearing would be warranted to give Defendants the opportunity to contradict what you just -- for instance, one item, you just indicated that forensics show these were not deleted as she said and they were, in fact, referenced by her.

MS. CORKEN: Well, I don't think that an evidentiary hearing would be of any benefit on that point because that was information that was developed -- that was information that was developed after the search warrant was executed. Now, the GM documents, trade secret documents, did exist on the MTI drive when the affidavit was created in May of 2006, and Shannon Du supposedly claims she had deleted documents. Well, they were still there at the time that CPC seized that computer in August of 2005. She left GM's employment in March of 2005 so months later the GM trade secret documents still existed on the MTI hard drive. And I

don't think that point is disputed in any way, so I don't think that an evidentiary hearing would be beneficial on that point.

Your Honor, Magistrate Judge Scheer certainly had sufficient facts before him to conclude that Defendants intended to convert the GM trade secret information to their own benefit. First of all, there is no requirement that the Government must show that the Defendants actually used the trade secret information in order to establish that intent. And there are --

THE COURT: What needs to be shown?

MS. CORKEN: Well, it can be shown from other evidence, Your Honor, but first and foremost there is evidence of use in this case, and that's set forth in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the affidavit.

There are two documents -- those paragraphs describe two documents that were found on the MTI drive that incorporated GM information. Those documents are not GM documents and yet they incorporated GM information, and one of those documents, in fact, specifically referred to these GM devices. GM IGBTs were referenced in this document. So contrary to the defense claim though it is not required the affidavit does set forth actual use of the GM information in documents that were found on a hard drive that was used in the Defendants' business.

But in addition to that Judge Magistrate Sheer had before him the following facts: Shannon Du copied thousands of GM files to a hard drive used in her and her husband's business days after she was offered a severance agreement and with one foot out of GM's door. Now, certainly she is not copying those thousands of files for work purposes. A reasonable conclusion is that she and her husband intended to convert them for somebody's use other than GM's. She then falsely affirmed to GM just six weeks later on the last day of her employment that she had returned all GM documents when, in fact, she had not.

Now, there are extensive facts in the affidavit relating the value of the GM trade secret documents to the business of MTI. MTI had a business that involved the power control field, and Peter Savagian was -- became familiar with what MTI did in this field, and he states -- you know, it is stated in this affidavit that particular GM documents found on the MTI drive would have been a value to MTI's business in the power electronics field.

In addition, MTI had embarked on two ventures relating to hybrid vehicle technology, one in 2004 and one in 2005. Both of those ventures involved selling hybrid vehicle motor control technology to China, and the MTI -- excuse me, the GM documents on the MTI drive largely related to the motor control of a hybrid vehicle. There are several

paragraphs in the affidavit where it is relayed that

Peter Savagian looked at these two ventures that MTI was

undertaking in 2004 and 2005, and then he basically looked at

the documents that were on the MTI hard drive and concluded

that those documents would have been a value to MTI,

particularly if MTI was embarking on a venture that involved

selling that technology.

So given the value of the GM documents to MTI's business ventures both in the power electronic field and in the hybrid vehicle area, Judge Magistrate Sheer could certainly conclude in addition to Shannon Du's conduct in copying these documents very shortly before her departure that the Defendants intended to convert the documents for their own use or the use of their company.

Now, certainly Magistrate Judge Sheer's decision in that regard was not arbitrary, and, of course, at this point the Court is required to give his decision great deference. So given all of those facts it is the Government's position that he was certainly entitled to find that there was probable cause to believe the Defendants intended to convert the documents to their own economic use.

Lastly, Your Honor, with respect to the probable cause to search the Newcastle residence, the defense has cited this McPherson case and I believe the facts are a little bit different than what was relayed by Mr. Eaman. In

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my reading of the case at least it appears that in that case the defendant was arrested for an assault charge. Officers had gone to his home to execute a warrant in which he was charged with an assault charge, and they arrested him outside of his home, and then they searched him incident to his arrest and they found some cocaine in his pocket, and then they obtained a search warrant basically alleging just that fact, that one fact, that he was outside of his home and there was cocaine in his pocket. There was no other -- there was no indication that he was a drug dealer. There was no information from a confidential informant. There was simply the fact that he had cocaine in his possession outside of his home. And the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals understandably found that that was not a sufficient nexus between whatever the Defendant's -- whatever his drug activities were and his home.

The case that we have here is far different and certainly the facts before Magistrate Judge Scheer were beyond those that were set forth in McPherson. For instance, in the affidavit it is relayed that Defendant Du told GM representatives that she used a flash drive to transfer the GM documents to the MTI hard drive and that the flash drive was located in her residence. I mean, that fact alone would allow the FBI -- would allow a magistrate to find probable cause to search the Newcastle home.

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              THE COURT:
                           And they hadn't actually moved into
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     Newcastle yet, or had they?
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              MS. CORKEN:
                            They had.
                           They actually had even though they
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              THE COURT:
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     still had the Davis house?
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                                  The affidavit, I believe,
              MS. CORKEN:
                            Yes.
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     describes it that agents went in as prospective buyers,
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     posing as prospective buyers, and a real estate agent -- the
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     house is for sale, the real estate agent was selling the
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            There was very little in the house at that time.
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     There was one computer, there was some MTI files, but there
     was not much else there. They had moved, and I believe the
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     affidavit lays out too that the utilities had been switched
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     to the Newcastle residence. I don't think there is any
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     dispute about the fact that the Defendants had moved into the
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     Newcastle home at this time.
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              The affidavit also explained that -- back to the
     flash card for a second.
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                               The affidavit explained that
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     Shannon Du could not have taken that flash card and directly
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     plugged it into the hard drive, she had to use an
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     intermediary computer. So the facts establish that there
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     were three computers and there was only one in the Davis
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     Court residence, so certainly it was reasonable to conclude
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     that these additional two computers were in the Defendants'
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     new residence.
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residence.

Now, the defense makes this necessity argument that, well, CPC had already imaged in the context of the civil case the three computers, so the FBI could have subpoenaed CPC and gotten those images itself. I assume the defense is concluding therefore there is no probable cause. Well, necessity is not a factor that Judge Scheer was supposed to take into account, and certainly he was not obligated to require the FBI to seek a subpoena to get second-best evidence, copies of the images of the hard drives, as opposed to obtaining a search warrant for the original evidence, the original computers. There is also set forth in the affidavit a number of --This is one of those areas where had THE COURT: you used the copies defense would be back saying you had the copies and not the original? MS. CORKEN: Surely. THE COURT: Okay. Go on. This house thing doesn't bother me. Go on. MS. CORKEN: There are also a number of sources of information cited in the affidavit that the Defendants used their residence as a principal place of business.

to the Newcastle address, you know, Judge Magistrate Scheer

So the fact that they had moved their residence

no evidence that MTI operated anywhere other than their

certainly was reasonably concluded that they were then using their new residence as the principal place of business for their MTI company.

And in addition, the agents' tour of their home corroborated that because there were some, but very few, MTI files that were actually in their old residence. Again, one could reasonably conclude that there were additional documents that were located in the new residence.

So, I mean, given all of the facts that are laid out in the affidavit there was certainly fair probability, which is the standard, a fair probability that evidence of crime would be found at the Newcastle residence.

And then lastly, Your Honor, even if the Court were to find that Magistrate Judge Scheer was wrong and that, you know, despite the great deference that is given to his decision at this stage that there really wasn't probable cause to search the Newcastle residence or that there wasn't probable cause on the intent to convert, certainly the exclusionary rule should not apply because the agent relied in good faith on the warrant. This is a 36-page affidavit. It is full of detail. It is -- in my experience, it is one of the best affidavits I have ever seen. The agent having brought the affidavit to an AUSA which is indicated by the fact that Sheldon Light's name is on the top of the search warrant, he got it reviewed by an AUSA, and then a magistrate

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found probable cause and given the nature of the affidavit
itself certainly his reliance on that warrant was in good
faith and he had a belief in its validity that was
reasonable. So even if probable cause is found lacking the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.
                     All right. Reply? Mr. Eaman, starting
         THE COURT:
backwards, the fact that the Newcastle home, I think that's a
fairly weak argument, but I would like you to -- sorry about
that, but I think that's your weakest argument.
         MR. EAMAN:
                     I thought it was our strongest.
shows what I know.
                    I mean, looking at that do you have any
         THE COURT:
evidence that MTI was operated anywhere other than the
residence of these parties?
                     Well, it had, and it is in the
         MR. EAMAN:
affidavit that it had been operating at other places --
         THE COURT:
                     You said that --
                     -- in the past.
         MR. EAMAN:
                     -- but I don't know what evidence, it
         THE COURT:
just says it.
                     I quarrel with the Court only because I
         MR. EAMAN:
don't think we have to come forward showing evidence that MTI
worked -- had business at another location at the time the
affiant executed the affidavit. I think the job is on the
affiant to investigate, to determine whether or not, in fact,
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the items that he seeks to seize are on the premises of the place that he seeks to seize.
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THE COURT: Okay. What about her statement, Du's statement, that she gave -- that she copied it to a hard drive -- excuse me, to a flash drive and that the flash drive was at her residence?

MR. EAMAN: Well, let me back up.

THE COURT: Are you --

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I don't know whether the flash drive MR. EAMAN: was at her residence or whether a flash drive was recovered. If a flash drive was recovered it had deleted documents on it, I believe. And let me say as to the computers they say they are looking for three computers and only one is at Davis Court, but they identify in paragraph 138 that CPC had the originals of those three computers. If you read paragraph 138 CPC took the hard drives out of those computers and cloned them and gave the clones back, I believe, is the procedure that was followed, so CPC had the originals. weren't going after the originals. They had access without going there, so there really was nothing to find there. don't -- whether the flash drive had it or not, they had the documents on several computers.

A flash drive, obviously, is used to transfer.

They had an admission of Ms. Du that she had used the flash drive to transfer. They had the CPC desktop, the CPC laptop,

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the hard drive that was left at CPC, they had the three drives from the computers that were at their home already in CPC's possession, so what was there to get from the residence? Certainly a flash drive that was used in the transfer process where they have basically all the computers the family had access to would not be sufficient to establish probable cause to conduct a general search of the premises, seize all the computers and all the documents at the place.
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Let me correct one thing that the Government said.

THE COURT: Did the Government have what C -- what is it?

MR. EAMAN: CPC.

THE COURT: CPC. Did the Government have what CPC had at the time of the search warrant?

MR. EAMAN: Absolutely. As we note in our reply, the Government had access to CPC and they got the information from CPC, they got the hard drives from CPC, they had everything from CPC. They asked that a representative of CPC come with them on the search to look through the house.

THE COURT: Okay. Just a minute. How long before the search did they have the CPC --

MR. EAMAN: Long enough to do the analysis to find the documents on the drives that they were talking about in the affidavit.

THE COURT: But what does that mean? What does

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that mean, long enough? Are we talking months?

MR. EAMAN: Yes, months.
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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EAMAN: I think from May to August if memory serves me correct.

THE COURT: So they would have no way of knowing what would be on the Millennium drives, the MTI drives, as of the date of the search warrant?

MR. EAMAN: Yes, they would.

THE COURT: How?

MR. EAMAN: They had those drives. CPC took the Millennium hard drive and had possession of it and they had possession when they contacted the Government. We don't know, and this is where an evidentiary --

THE COURT: But you're assuming that then
Millennium stopped doing anything. You don't know that there
wouldn't be evidence on the drives in the home of MTI using
this information?

MR. EAMAN: Well, we do know that the three computers that were at the home of Qin and Du were copied and given to CPC.

THE COURT: Yes, but that's why I asked you how long ago. There is a period of time that went by.

MR. EAMAN: Again, our problem with the affidavit, to be frank, no pun intended, that would be a double pun in

this case, I guess, is that when we get the discovery and we do the analysis it appears to us this affidavit is on its face terrific because it is lengthy and it is detailed but on its face it is misleading. It omits things and reaches conclusions that are not correct.

THE COURT: Go specifically to what it is that you believe an evidentiary hearing would disclose.

MR. EAMAN: Well, there are all kinds of allegations going back about this paragraph 37, the majority of the documents are marked confidential, the hybrid electric motor controller card documents. Again, I'm not sure. Paragraph 37 doesn't identify what a hybrid electric motor controller card is or which documents refer to that so we are not sure where there are competing allegations here about that paragraph 37. I think an evidentiary hearing would be helpful to see what the affiant had. If we are right that only 5 out of 14 documents that Savagian looked at were marked confidential, then to say that these documents — these particular documents were marked — the majority were marked confidential omits the conclusion that the majority of all of the documents were not marked confidential.

There were 3,000 GM documents in the Shanshan directory, I believe that's the right number. There were -- again, they were block transferred as if they were being backed up from time to time. I disagree. Again, an

evidentiary hearing would show that there was any access to these documents after it was disclosed that they were on the MTI hard drive and Ms. Du met with General Motors and told them that she had deleted the documents.

The evidentiary hearing would also establish that the Micron Millennium computer that the GM materials found in there, which that hard drive would have been in the possession of CPC, we believe, but the Government subsequently got it in the search warrant, that the GM documents and the Micron Millennium computer were in the deleted items file. So the Government had access to a computer of Qin and Du that showed that Du or someone had gone in and deleted the GM documents just like she told General Motors she had. So those are some of the things.

Also, regarding the offer to buyout, again, it is misleading. There were thousands of General Motors employees offered buyouts at this time. As I'm sure the Court is aware, General Motors was beginning its downward slide for reasons that has nothing to do with this case and were buying out employees right and left on every level. So the fact that she was offered a buyout would not -- does not -- it is not evidence that she was -- let me back up -- is not evidence that she was a bad employee. But, again, offered a buyout and the fact that she copied it on a day or a day after she was offered the buyout, she hadn't accepted the

buyout, she hadn't decided to accept the buyout, so the affidavit noticed she was upset, she didn't want to leave GM, that's what she told them, that she was upset she was being offered a buyout.

THE COURT: Is there any indication that this is the first time that she copied this information?

MR. EAMAN: I'm not sure about that. I think an evidentiary hearing would clear that up. I think she had backed up -- because they were copied to the hard drive after that point, but they were -- the other thing that is omitted here is everything -- every document that she supposedly shouldn't have had access to was on her GM laptop which although GM took reasonable measures to secure it that laptop was found basically in a closet unsecured after this investigation began and then secured. So there is an awful lot of misleading facts in this affidavit.

The reference to paragraph 44 that they found that one of the GM documents had been accessed and that calculations had been made, but I refer to that in my original argument they were made in 2004 when Du was still working at GM and they are part of e-mails that go back and forth between Qin and Du where Qin was assisting Du with the calculations that she was making while she worked at General Motors. They weren't being accessed to do calculations to provide to any third party.

THE COURT: Say that again. She had access on calculations she was making while she worked at General Motors?

MR. EAMAN: While she was working at General Motors Qin helped her with some calculations and accessed some of the GM documents to help her with those and e-mailed her the calculations that he did to assist her in her work at General Motors. It was not a case where the GM document was accessed, calculations were done and they were shipped off to a third party or they were retained for further use. They were not accessed after Qin e-mailed them to Du to assist her at General Motors because -- I may have said this originally, but these are two electrical engineers, both of them with experience in hybrid technology.

The Cherry Motors venture that they talk about consists of e-mails back and forth and a business plan drafted originally in Chinese by a Dr. Gjau (phonetic) for a hybrid car, and it is sort of like do you want to build a hybrid car, do you want to try to sell hybrid technology to Cherry Motors, what do you think we should do here? There was a manufacturer's rep involved and a few e-mails went back and forth. That was it. There is no contact with Cherry Motors. There is no e-mail to Cherry Motors. There is no letter to Cherry Motors. There was no contact whatsoever with China about

anything.

And, again, Savagian, and I suppose the affiant may have had to accept this, says, well, this technology might have been useful for the venture that was discussed with Cherry Motors. There was no venture that ever happened, number one. Number two, it was what is called a direct-drive hybrid car, a different kind of car than General Motors made.

In terms of utilities, the utilities at both houses were still in the names of Du and Qin. We don't dispute the affiant saying that the utility usage in Davis Court fell off and the utility usage at Newcastle went up, and from that I think they can conclude that it was their principal residence at the time. The issue is are there facts alleged here other than it is their principal residence that would lead to probable cause that what they were looking for was, in fact, at Davis Court and not in some other location.

Does the Court have any questions?

THE COURT: No.

MR. EAMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I really do not see the need here for an evidentiary hearing. It seems to me that these facts are here from which the magistrate judge could appropriately make his ruling. I want to review this. I will review the attachments to the affidavit again in light of the arguments. I think I will have you come back in so I

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can give you my ruling because for me to write it would take
much longer time than simply to tell you. So let me ask
you -- I need probably, given the schedule, about two weeks.
Let's look at the beginning of February. I don't know if
there is any time more convenient, but I'm just picking a
date here, February 3rd.
                         I do have time in the morning on
that date. How is that schedule?
         MR. EAMAN: Judge, I just found out last night I
may have to go out of town that weekend, so I was planning on
leaving that day.
         THE COURT:
                     That day?
                     That day, Thursday, February 3rd.
         MR. EAMAN:
         THE COURT:
                     Let me go back a day.
         MR. EAMAN:
                     February 2nd would be okay if the Court
can move it up a day, or the following --
         THE COURT:
                    Mr. Morgan.
         MR. MORGAN:
                      Judge, before you go looking again, I
would indicate to the Court that I am leaving on a prepaid
trip Friday, January 28th and returning on February 9th.
Although, if it is the Court's ruling I'm sure the Court
would not have a difficulty if Mr. Eaman was here for both
Defendants. I don't think my client, although it is
premature for me to say that, that my client would have a
problem with that.
         THE COURT: I could do it February 9th. Are you
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going to be back in town, Mr. Eaman?
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                          On February 9th I will be. Looks like
               MR. EAMAN:
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     I have a preliminary examination in 36th District Court that
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     morning, but I could be here in the afternoon on the 9th if
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     that works for the Court.
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               THE COURT:
                          February 9th I could do it at 2:00.
 7
               MR. EAMAN:
                          That's fine, Your Honor.
 8
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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               MR. EAMAN:
                          Thank you.
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               THE COURT:
                          All right. All right. Then I will see
11
     you back here February 9th at 2:00.
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               MR. EAMAN:
                           Thank you.
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               MS. CORKEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you very much.
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               (Proceedings concluded at 11:39 a.m.)
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1	CERTIFICATION
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3	I, Robert L. Smith, Official Court Reporter of
4	the United States District Court, Eastern District of
5	Michigan, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages comprise
6	a full, true and correct transcript taken in the matter of
7	THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. YU QIN and SHANSHAN DU, Case
8	No. 10-20454, on Thursday, January 20, 2011.
9	
10	s/Robert L. Smith Robert L. Smith, CSR 5098
11	Federal Official Court Reporter United States District Court
12	Eastern District of Michigan
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15	Date: 04/13/2011
16	Detroit, Michigan
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